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Abstract. Test instability in a floating-point program occurs when the
control flow of the program diverges from its ideal execution assuming
real arithmetic. This phenomenon is caused by the presence of round-
off errors that affect the evaluation of arithmetic expressions occurring
in conditional statements. Unstable tests may lead to significant errors
in safety-critical applications that depend on numerical computations.
Writing programs that take into consideration test instability is a dif-
ficult task that requires expertise on finite precision computations and
rounding errors. This paper presents a toolchain to automatically gener-
ate and verify a provably correct test-stable floating-point program from
a functional specification in real arithmetic. The input is a real-valued
program written in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) specifica-
tion language and the output is a transformed floating-point C program
annotated with ANSI/ISO C Specification Language (ACSL) contracts.
These contracts relate the floating-point program to its functional spec-
ification in real arithmetic. The transformed program detects if unstable
tests may occur and, in these cases, issues a warning and terminate. An
approach that combines the Frama-C analyzer, the PRECiSA round-off
error estimator, and PVS is proposed to automatically verify that the
generated program code is correct in the sense that, if the program ter-
minates without a warning, it follows the same computational path as
its real-valued functional specification.
Key Words: Floating-Point numbers, Round-off error analysis, Pro-
gram transformation
1 Introduction
The development of software that depends on floating-point computa-
tions is particularly challenging due to the presence of round-off errors
in computer arithmetic. Round-off errors originate from the difference
between real numbers and their finite precision representation. Since
round-off errors accumulate during numerical computations, they may
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significantly affect the evaluation of both arithmetic and Boolean ex-
pressions. In particular, unstable tests occur when the guard of a con-
ditional statement contains a floating-point expression whose round-off
error makes the actual Boolean value of the guard differ from the value
that would be obtained assuming real arithmetic. The presence of un-
stable tests amplifies, even more, the divergence between the output of
a floating-point program and its ideal evaluation in real arithmetic. This
divergence may lead to catastrophic consequences in safety-critical ap-
plications.
Writing software that takes into consideration how unstable tests
affect the execution flow of floating-point programs requires a deep com-
prehension of floating-point arithmetic. Furthermore, this process can
be tedious and error-prone for programs with function calls and com-
plex mathematical expressions. This paper presents a fully automatic
toolchain to generate and verify test-stable floating-point C code from a
functional specification in real arithmetic. This toolchain consists of:
– a formally-verified program transformation that generates and in-
struments a floating-point program to detect unstable tests,
– PRECiSA [41,51], a static analyzer that computes sound estimations
of the round-off error that may occur in a floating-point program,
– Frama-C [37], a collaborative tool suite for the analysis of C code,
and
– the Prototype Verification System (PVS) [43], an interactive theorem
prover for higher-order logic.
The input of the toolchain is a PVS specification of a numerical algo-
rithm in real arithmetic, the desired floating-point format (single or dou-
ble precision), and, optionally, initial ranges for the input variables. This
program specification is straightforwardly implemented using floating-
point arithmetic. This is done by replacing each real-valued operator by
its floating-point counterpart. Furthermore, each real-number constant
and variable is rounded to its closest floating-point in the chosen format
and rounding modality. Then, the proposed program transformation is
applied. Numerically unstable tests are replaced with more restrictive
ones that preserve the control flow of the real-valued original specifica-
tion. These new tests take into consideration the round-off error that
may occur when the expressions of the original program are evaluated
in floating-point arithmetic. In addition, the transformation instruments
the program to emit a warning when the floating-point flow may diverge
with respect to the original real number specification.
The transformed program is expressed in C syntax along with ACSL
Specification Language annotations stating the relationship between the
floating-point C implementation and its functional specification in real
arithmetic. To this end, the round-off errors that occur in conditional
tests and in the overall computation of the program are soundly esti-
mated by the static analyzer PRECiSA. The correctness property of the
C program is specified as an ACSL post-condition stating that if the pro-
gram terminates without a warning, it follows the same computational
path as the real-valued specification, i.e., all unstable tests are detected.
An extension to the Frama-C/WP plug-in (Weakest Precondition cal-
culus) is implemented to automatically generate verification conditions
in the PVS language from the annotated C code. These verification con-
ditions encode the correctness of the transformed program and are auto-
matically discharged by proof strategies implemented in PVS. Therefore,
no expertise in theorem proving nor knowledge on floating-point arith-
metic is required from the user to verify the correctness of the generated
C program.
The contributions of this work are summarized below.
– A new and enhanced version of the program trasformation initially
defined in [53] that adds support for function calls, bounded recursion
(for-loops), and symbolic parameters.
– A PVS formalization of the correctness of the proposed transforma-
tion.
– An implementation of the proposed transformation integrated within
the static analyzer PRECiSA.
– An extension of the Frama-C/WP plug-in to generate proof obliga-
tions in the PVS specification language.
– Proof strategies in PVS to automatically discharge the verification
conditions generated by the Frama-C/WP plug-in.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
technical background on floating-point numbers, round-off errors, and
unstable tests. A denotational semantics that collects information about
the differences between floating-point and real computational flows is
presented in Section 3. The proposed program transformation to detect
test instability is described in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the use of
the proposed toolchain to automatically generate and verify a probably
correct floating-point C program from a PVS real-valued specification.
Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Floating-Point Numbers, Round-Off Errors, and
Unstable Tests
Floating-point numbers [35] are finite precision representations of real
numbers widely used in computer programs. In this work, a floating-
point number, or a float, is formalized as a pair of integers (m, e) ∈ Z2,
wherem is called the significand and e the exponent of the float [24,10]. A
floating-point format f is defined as a pair of integers (p, emin), where p is
called the precision and emin is called the minimal exponent. Given a base
b, a pair (m, e) ∈ Z2 represents a floating-point number in the format
(p, emin) if and only if it holds that |m| < bp and −emin ≤ e. For instance,
IEEE single and double precision floating-point numbers are specified
by the formats (24, 149) and (53, 1074), respectively. Henceforth, F will
denote the set of floating-point numbers and the expression v˜ will denote
a floating-point number (m, e) in F. A conversion function R() : F →
R is defined to refer to the real number represented by a given float,
i.e., R((m, e)) = m · be , where b is the base of the representation. The
expression Ff (r) denotes the floating-point number in format f closest
to r, i.e., the rounding of r. The format f will be omitted when clear
from the context or irrelevant.
Definition 1 (Round-off error). Let v˜ ∈ F be a floating-point number
that represents a real number r ∈ R, the difference |R(v˜) − r| is called
the round-off error (or rounding error) of v˜ with respect to r.
The unit in the last place (ulp) is a measure of the precision of a floating-
point number as a representation of a real number. Given r ∈ R, ulp(r)
represents the difference between two closest consecutive floating-point
numbers v˜1 and v˜2 such that v˜1 ≤ r ≤ v˜2 and v˜1 6= v˜2. The ulp() can be
used to bound the round-off error of a real number r with respect to its
floating-point representation in the following way:
|R(F(r))− r | ≤ 12 ulp(r). (2.1)
Round-off errors accumulate through the computation of mathemat-
ical operators. Therefore, an initial error that seems negligible may be-
come significantly larger when combined and propagated inside nested
mathematical expressions. The accumulated round-off error is the differ-
ence between a floating-point expression ˜(v˜1, . . . , v˜n) and its real-valued
counterpart (r1, . . . , rn) and it depends on (a) the error introduced by
the application of ˜ versus  and (b) the propagation of the errors
carried out by the arguments, i.e., the difference between v˜i and ri, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, in the application. Henceforth, it is assumed that for any
floating-point operator of interest ˜, there exists an error bound func-
tion ˜() such that, if |R(v˜i) − ri| ≤ ei holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then:
∣∣R(˜(v˜i)ni=1)−(ri)ni=1∣∣ ≤ ˜(ri, ei)ni=1. (2.2)
For example, in the case of the sum, the accumulated round-ff error is
defined as +˜(r1, e1, r2, e2) := e1 + e2 + 1/2 ulp(|r1 + r2|+ e1 + e2). More
examples of error bound functions can be found in [41,51].
The evaluation of Boolean expressions is also affected by rounding
errors. When a Boolean expression φ evaluates differently in real and
floating-point arithmetic, φ is said to be unstable. The presence of un-
stable tests amplifies the effect of round-off errors in numerical programs
since the computational flow of a floating-point program may signifi-
cantly diverge from the ideal execution of its representation in real arith-
metic. In fact, the output of a floating-point program is not only directly
influenced by rounding errors accumulating in the mathematical expres-
sions, but also by the error of taking the incorrect branch in the case of
unstable tests.
Given a set Ω˜ of pre-defined floating-point operations, the corre-
sponding set Ω of operations over real numbers, a set Σ of function
symbols, a finite set V of variables representing real values, and a finite
set V˜ of variables representing floating-point values, where V and V˜ are
disjoint, the sets A and A˜ of arithmetic expressions over real numbers
and over floating-point numbers, respectively, are defined by the follow-
ing grammars.
A ::= d | x | (A, . . . ,A) | f(A, . . . ,A),
A˜ ::= d˜ | x˜ | ˜(A˜, . . . , A˜) | f˜(A˜, . . . , A˜),
where A ∈ A, d ∈ R, x ∈ V, f, f˜ ∈ Σ,  ∈ Ω, A˜ ∈ A˜, d˜ ∈ F, x˜ ∈ V˜,
and ˜ ∈ Ω˜. It is assumed that there is a function χr () : V˜ → V that
associates to each floating-point variable x˜ a variable x ∈ V representing
the real value of x˜. The function RA˜() : A˜ → A converts an arithmetic
expression on floating-point numbers to an arithmetic expression on real
numbers. It is defined by replacing each floating-point operation with
the corresponding one on real numbers and by applying R() and χr () to
floating-point values and variables, respectively. Conversely, the function
FA˜() : A → A˜ converts a real expression into a floating-point one by
applying the rounding F() to constants and variables and by replacing
each real-valued operator with the corresponding floating-point one. By
abuse of notation, floating-point expressions are interpreted as their real
number evaluation when occurring inside a real-valued expression.
Boolean expressions over the reals B and over the floats B˜ are defined
by the following grammar,
B ::= true | false | B ∧ B | B ∨ B | ¬B | A < A | A = A
B˜ ::= true | false | B˜ ∧ B˜ | B˜ ∨ B˜ | ¬B˜ | A˜ < A˜ | A˜ = A˜
where A ∈ A and A˜ ∈ A˜. The conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, negation ¬,
true, and false have the usual classical logic meaning. The functions
RB˜() : B˜ → B and FB˜() : B → B˜ convert a Boolean expression on
floating-point numbers to a Boolean expression on real numbers and
vice-versa. They are defined, respectively, as the natural extension of
RA˜() and FA˜() to Boolean expressions. Given a variable assignment
σ : V → R, evalB(σ,B) ∈ {true, false} denotes the evaluation of the
real Boolean expression B. Similarly, given B˜ ∈ B˜ and σ˜ : V˜ → F,
e˜val B˜(σ˜, B˜) ∈ {true, false} denotes the evaluation of the floating-point
Boolean expression B˜.
Definition 2 (Unstable Test). A test φ˜ ∈ B˜ is unstable if there exist
two assignments σ˜ : {x˜1, . . . , x˜n} → F and σ : {χr (x˜1), . . . , χr (x˜n)} → R
such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σ(χr (x˜i)) = R(σ˜(x˜i)) and evalB(σ,RB˜(φ˜))
6= e˜val B˜(σ˜, φ˜). Otherwise, the conditional expression is said to be stable.
In other words, a test φ˜ is unstable when there exists an assignment
from the free variables x˜i in φ˜ to F such that φ˜ evaluates to a different
Boolean value with respect to its real-valued counterpart RB˜(φ˜). The
evaluation of a conditional statement if φ then A else B is said to follow
an unstable path when φ is unstable and it is evaluated differently in real
and floating-point arithmetic. When the flows coincide, the evaluation is
said to follow a stable path.
3 A Denotational Semantics for Floating-Point
Programs
This section illustrates a denotational semantics to reason about round-
off errors and test instability in floating-point programs. This semantics
collects information about both real and floating-point path conditions
and soundly estimates the difference between the ideal real-valued result
and the actual floating-point one. This information is collected symbol-
ically. Therefore, the semantics supports symbolic parameters for which
the numerical inputs are unknown. This semantics is an extension of
the one presented in [51] and it has been implemented in the static an-
alyzer PRECiSA, which computes provably correct over-estimations of
the round-off errors occurring in a floating-point program.
The language considered in this work is a simple functional language
with binary and n-ary conditionals, let-in expressions, arithmetic expres-
sions, function calls, for-loops, and a warning exceptional statement ω.
The syntax of floating-point program expressions S˜ in S˜ is given by the
following grammar.
S˜ ::=d˜ | x˜ | ˜(A˜, . . . , A˜) | f˜(A˜, . . . , A˜) | let x˜ = A˜ in S˜
| if B˜ then S˜ else S˜ | if B˜ then S˜ [elsif B˜ then S˜ ]mj=1 else S˜
| for(i0, in, acc0, λ(i, acc).S˜ ) | ω,
(3.1)
where x ∈ V, f˜ ∈ Σ,  ∈ Ω, A˜ ∈ A˜, B˜ ∈ B˜, d˜ , acc0 ∈ F, x˜, i, acc ∈ V˜,
˜ ∈ Ω˜, i0 ∈ N and n, in ∈ N>0. The notation [elsif B˜ then S˜ ]mj=1 denotes
a list of m conditional elsif branches.
Bounded recursion is added to the language as syntactic sugar using
the for construct. The for(, , , ) expression emulates a for loop where i is
the control variable that ranges from i0 to in, acc is the variable where
the result is accumulated with initial value acc0, and S˜ is the body of
the loop. For instance, for(1, 10, 0, λ(i, acc).i+ acc) represents the value
f(1, 0), where f is the recursive function f(i, acc) ≡ if i > 10 then
acc else f(i+ 1, acc + i).
A floating-point program P˜ is defined as a set of function declarations
of the form f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) = S˜ , where x˜1, . . . , x˜n are pairwise distinct
variables in V˜ and all free variables appearing in S˜ are in {x˜1, . . . , x˜n}.
The natural number n is called the arity of f˜ . Henceforth, it is assumed
that programs are well-formed in the sense that, in a program P˜ , for
every function call f˜(A˜1, . . . , A˜n) that occurs in the body of the declara-
tion of a function g˜, a unique function f˜ of arity n is defined in P˜ before
g˜. Hence, the only recursion allowed is the one provided by the for-loop
construct. The set of floating-point programs is denoted as P˜.
The proposed semantics collects for each combination of real and
floating-point program paths: the real and floating-point path condi-
tions, and three symbolic expressions representing: (1) the value of the
output assuming the use of real arithmetic, (2) the value of the output
assuming floating-point arithmetic, and (3) an over-approximation of the
maximum round-off error occurring in the computation. In addition, a
flag is provided indicating if the element refers to either a stable or an
unstable path. Since the semantics collects information about real and
floating-point execution paths, it is possible to consider the error of tak-
ing the incorrect branch compared to the ideal execution using exact
real arithmetic. This enables a sound treatment of unstable tests. The
previous information is stored in a conditional error bound.
Definition 3 (Conditional error bound). A conditional error bound
is an expression of the form 〈η, η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e), where η ∈ B, η˜ ∈ B˜,
r ∈ A ∪ {ω}, v˜ ∈ A˜ ∪ {ω}, and e ∈ A,t ∈ {s,u}.
Intuitively, 〈η, η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) indicates that if both conditions η and η˜
are satisfied, the output of the ideal real-valued implementation of the
program is r, the output of the floating-point execution is v˜, and the
round-off error is at most e, i.e., |r − v˜| ≤ e. The sub-index t is used to
mark by construction whether a conditional error bound corresponds to
an unstable path, when t = u, or to a stable path, when t = s.
Let C be the set of all conditional error bounds, and C := ℘(C) be
the domain formed by sets of conditional error bounds. An environment
is defined as a function mapping a variable to a set of conditional error
bounds, i.e., Env = V˜→ C. The empty environment is denoted as ⊥Env
and maps every variable to the empty set ∅. LetMGC := {f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) |
f˜ ∈ Σ, x˜1, . . . , x˜n ∈ V˜} be the set of all possible function calls. An
interpretation is a function I : MGC → C modulo variance3. The set of
all interpretations is denoted as I. The empty interpretation is denoted
as ⊥I and maps everything to ∅.
Given ν ∈ Env and I ∈ I, the semantics of program expressions is
defined in Fig. 1 as a function E [[]] : S˜×Env × I→ C that returns the set
3 Two functions I1, I2 : MGC → C are variants if for each m ∈ MGC there exists a
renaming ρ such that (I1(m))ρ = I2(mρ).
of conditional error bounds representing the possible real and floating-
point results, their difference, and their corresponding path conditions.
Conditional error bounds of the form 〈η, η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) whose conditions’
conjunction is unsatisfiable, i.e., η ∧ η˜ 6⇒ false, are considered spurious
and they are dropped from the semantics since they do not correspond
to an actual trace of the program. In the following, the non-trivial cases
are described.
Variable. The semantics of a variable x˜ ∈ V˜ consists of two cases. If
x˜ belongs to the environment, then the variable has been previously
bound to a program expression S˜ through a let-in expression. In this
case, the semantics of x˜ is exactly the semantics of S˜ . If x˜ does not
belong to the environment, then x˜ is a parameter of the function.
Here, a new conditional error bound is added with two placeholder
χr (x˜) and χe(x˜), representing the real value and the error of x˜,
respectively.
Mathematical Operator. The semantics of a floating-point operation
˜ is computed by composing the semantics of its operands. The real
and floating-point values are obtained by applying the correspond-
ing arithmetic operation to the values of the operands. The effect
of the warning construct ω is propagated in the arithmetic expres-
sions. Thus, it is assumed that for all floating-point and real opera-
tor , (ri)ni=1 = ω when rj = ω for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The new
conditions are obtained as the combination of the conditions of the
operands. The new conditional error bounds for ˜(v˜i)ni=1 are marked
unstable if any of the conditional error bounds in the semantics of
v˜i is unstable. gni=1ti is defined as u if it exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that tj = u, otherwise it is defined as s.
Let-in expression. The semantics of the expression let x˜ = A˜ in S˜
updates the current environment by associating with variable x˜ the
semantics of expression A˜.
Binary conditional. The semantics of the conditional if B˜ then S˜1 else
S˜2 uses an auxiliary operator ⇓(,).
Definition 4 (Condition propagation operator). Let b ∈ B and
b˜ ∈ B˜, 〈φ, φ˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) ⇓(b,b˜):= 〈φ ∧ b, φ˜ ∧ b˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) if φ ∧
b ∧ φ˜ ∧ b˜ 6⇒ false, otherwise it is undefined. The definition of ⇓(,)
naturally extends to sets of conditional error bounds, i.e., let C ∈ C,
C ⇓(b,b˜)=
⋃
c∈C c ⇓(b,b˜).
The semantics of S˜1 and S˜2 are enriched with information about the
fact that real and floating-point control flows match, i.e., both B˜
and RB˜(B˜) have the same value. In addition, new conditional error
bounds are built to model the unstable cases when real and floating-
point control flows do not coincide and, therefore, real and floating-
point computations diverge. For example, if B˜ is satisfied but RB˜(B˜)
is not, the then branch is taken in the floating-point computation, but
the else would have been taken in the real one. In this case, the real
condition and its corresponding output are taken from the semantics
of S˜2, while the floating-point condition and its corresponding output
are taken from the semantics of S˜1. The condition (¬RB˜(B˜), B˜) is
propagated in order to model that B˜ holds but RB˜(B˜) does not. The
conditional error bounds representing this case are marked with u.
N-ary conditional. The semantics of an n-ary conditional is composed
of stable and unstable cases. The stable cases are built from the se-
mantics of all the program sub-expressions S˜i by enriching them with
information stating that the correspondent guard and its real coun-
terpart hold and all the previous guards and their real counterparts
do not hold. All the unstable combinations are built by combining
the real parts of the semantics of a program expression S˜i and the
floating-point contributions of a different program expression S˜j . In
addition, the operator ⇓(,) is used to propagate the information that
the real guard of S˜i and the floating-point guard of S˜j hold, while
the guards of the previous branches do not hold.
Function call. The semantics of a function call combines the condi-
tions coming from the interpretation of the function and the ones
coming from the semantics of the parameters. Variables representing
real values, floating-point values, and errors of formal parameters are
replaced with the expressions coming from the semantics of the ac-
tual parameters. The notation expr [x← e] denotes the substitution
of x for e in the expression expr .
The semantics of a program is a function F [[]] : P˜→ C defined as the
least fixed point of the immediate consequence operator P[[]] : P˜×I→ C,
i.e., given P˜ ∈ P˜, F [[P˜ ]] := lfp()(P[[P˜ ]]⊥I), which is defined as follows for
each function symbol f˜ defined in P˜ .
P[[P˜ ]]I(f˜ (x˜1 . . . x˜n)) := E [[S˜ ]]I⊥Env if f˜ (x˜1 . . . x˜n) = S˜ ∈ P˜ . (3.2)
The least fixed point of P[[]] is guaranteed to exist from the Knaster-
Tarski Fixpoint theorem [48] since P[[]] is monotonic over C. This least
fixed-point converges in a finite number of steps for the programs with
bounded recursion considered in this paper.
Example 1. Consider the function t˜coa that is part of DAIDALUS4 (De-
tect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems), a NASA library
that implements detect-and-avoid algorithms for unmanned aircraft sys-
tems. This function computes the time to co-altitude of two vertically
converging aircraft given their relative vertical position s˜ and relative
vertical velocity v˜. When the aircraft air vertically diverging, the func-
tion returns 0.
t˜coa(s˜, v˜) =if s˜∗˜v˜ < 0 then −(s˜/˜v˜) else 0
4 DAIDALUS is available from https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/DAIDALUS/.
The semantics of t˜coa(s˜, v˜) consists of four conditional error bounds:
{〈χr (s˜) ∗ χr (v˜) < 0, s˜∗˜v˜ < 0〉s  (−(χr (s˜)/χr (v˜)),−(s˜/˜v˜),
/˜(χr (s˜), χe(s˜), χr (v˜), χe(v˜))),
〈χr (s˜) ∗ χr (v) ≥ 0, s˜∗˜v˜ ≥ 0〉s  (0, 0, 0),
〈χr (s˜) ∗ χr (v˜) ≥ 0, s˜∗˜v˜ < 0〉u  (0,−(s˜/˜v˜), /˜(χr (s˜), χe(s˜), χr (v˜), χe(v˜))
+ |0− (χr (s˜)/χr (v˜))|),
〈χr (s˜) ∗ χr (v˜) < 0, s˜∗˜v˜ ≥ 0〉u  (−(χr (s˜)/χr (v˜)), 0, |0− (χr (s˜)/χr (v˜))|)}.
The first two elements correspond to the cases where real and floating-point
computational flows coincide. In these cases, the round-off error is bounded by
/˜(χr (s˜), χe(s˜), χr (v˜), χe(v˜)) when the then branch is taken, otherwise, it is 0
since the integer 0 is exactly representable as a float. The other two elements
model the unstable paths. In these cases, the error is computed as the difference
between the output of the two branches plus the accumulated round-off error
of the floating-point result.
A real-valued program (or, simply, a real program) has the same
structure of a floating-point program where floating-point expressions
are replaced with real number ones. A real-valued program does not
contain any ω statements. The set of real-valued programs is denoted
as P. The function FP˜() : P → P˜ converts a real program P into a
floating-point one by applying, respectively, FB˜() and FA˜() to Boolean
and arithmetic expressions occurring in the function declarations in P .
Conversely, RP˜() : P˜ → P returns the real-number counterpart of a
floating-point program. For every floating-point program P˜ ∈ P˜, it holds
that P˜ = FP˜(RP˜(P˜ )).
The presented semantics correctly models the difference between the
floating-point program P˜ and its real number counterpart RP˜(P˜ ) as
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let P˜ ∈ P˜ be a floating-point program. For every func-
tion symbol f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) defined in P˜, let f(x1, . . . , xn) be its real-
valued counterpart defined in RP˜(P˜) such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
xi = χr (x˜i). It holds that
|f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n)− f(x1, . . . , xn)| ≤ err f˜
where err f˜ = max{e | 〈η, η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) ∈ F [[P˜ ]](f˜)}. The expression
err f˜ is called the overall error of the function f .
Proof (Proof Sketch.). Given P˜ ∈ P˜, for each declaration f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) =
S˜ occurring in P˜ , it exists a declaration f(x1, . . . , xn) = S in RP˜(P˜).
Thus, |f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) − f(x1, . . . , xn)| ≤ err f˜ holds if and only if |S˜ −
S| ≤ err f˜ holds. The proof proceeds by structural induction on the
structure of the program expression S˜ . The main cases are the arithmetic
expression and the conditional.
E [[d˜ ]]Iν := {〈true, true〉s  (R(d˜), d˜ , |R(d˜)− d˜ |)}
E [[ω]]Iν := {〈true, true〉s  (ω, ω, 0)}
E [[x˜]]Iν :=
{
{〈true, true〉s  (χr (x˜), x˜, χe(x˜))} if ν(x˜) = ∅
ν(x˜) otherwise
E [[˜(A˜i)ni=1]]Iν := unionsq{ 〈
∧n
i=1φi,
∧n
i=1φ˜i〉gni=1ti  ((ri)
n
i=1, ˜(v˜i)ni=1, ˜(ri, ei)ni=1) | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n :
〈φi, φ˜i〉ti  (ri, v˜i, ei) ∈ E [[A˜i]]Iν ,
∧n
i=1φi ∧
∧n
i=1φ˜i 6⇒ false}
E [[let x˜ = A˜ in S˜ ]]Iν := E [[S˜ ]]Iν[x˜ 7→E[[A˜]]Iν ]
E [[if B˜ then S˜1 else S˜2]]Iν := E [[S˜1]]Iν ⇓(RB˜(B˜),B˜) unionsq E [[S˜2]]
I
ν ⇓(¬RB˜(B˜),¬B˜) unionsq
unionsq{〈φj , φ˜i〉u  (rj , v˜i, ei + |ri − rj |) | 〈φi, φ˜i〉s  (r1, v˜i, ei) ∈ E [[S˜i]]Iν ,
〈φj , φ˜j〉s  (rj , v˜j , ej) ∈ E [[S˜j ]]Iν , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, } ⇓(¬RB˜(B˜),B˜)
E [[if B˜1 then S˜1 [elsif B˜i then S˜i]n−1i=2 else S˜n]]Iν :=
unionsqn−1i=1 E [[S˜i]]Iν ⇓(B˜i∧∧i−1j=1 ¬B˜j ,R(B˜i)∧∧i−1j=1 ¬R(B˜j))
unionsq E [[S˜n]]Iν ⇓(∧n−1j=1 ¬B˜j ,∧n−1j=1 ¬R(B˜j)) unionsq
unionsq{〈ηi, η˜j〉u  (ri, v˜j , ej + |ri − rj |) | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, i 6= j, 〈ηi, η˜i〉s  (ri, v˜i, ei) ∈ E [[S˜i]]Iν ,
〈ηj , η˜j〉s  (rj , v˜j , ej) ∈ E [[S˜j ]]Iν} ⇓(B˜j∧∧j−1k=1 ¬B˜k,R(B˜i)∧∧i−1k=1 ¬R(B˜k)) unionsq
unionsq{〈ηi, η˜n〉u  (ri, v˜n, en + |ri − rn|) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, 〈ηi, η˜i〉s  (ri, v˜i, ei) ∈ E [[S˜i]]Iν ,
〈ηn, η˜n〉s  (rn, v˜n, en) ∈ E [[S˜n]]Iν} ⇓(∧n−1
k=1
¬B˜k,R(B˜i)∧
∧i−1
k=1
¬R(B˜k)) unionsq
unionsq{〈ηn, η˜i〉u  (rn, v˜i, ei + |ri − rn|) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, 〈ηi, η˜i〉s  (ri, v˜i, ei) ∈ E [[S˜i]]Iν ,
〈ηn, η˜n〉s  (rn, v˜n, en) ∈ E [[S˜n]]Iν} ⇓(B˜i∧∧i−1k=1 ¬B˜k,∧n−1k=1 ¬R(B˜k))
E [[for(i0, in, acc0, g˜)]]Iν := E [[g˜(in, (g˜(in − 1, (. . . g˜(i0 + 1, g˜(i0, acc0)) . . . ))]]Iν
E [[f˜(A˜i)ni=1]]Iν := unionsq{〈φ′ ∧
∧n
i=1φi, φ˜
′ ∧∧ni=1φ˜i〉t  (r′, v˜′, e′) |
〈φ, φ˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) ∈ I(f˜(x˜i)ni=1), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : 〈φi, φ˜i〉ti  (ri, v˜i, ei) ∈ E [[A˜i]]Iν ,
r′ = r[χr (x˜i)← ri]ni=1, v˜′ = v˜[x˜i ← v˜i]ni=1, e′ = e[χe(x˜i)← ei]ni=1,
φ′ = φ[χr (x˜i)← ri, χe(x˜i)← ei, x˜i ← v˜i]ni=1, φ˜′ = φ˜[χr (x˜i)← ri, χe(x˜i)← ei, x˜i ← v˜i]ni=1,
φ′ ∧∧ni=1φi ∧ φ˜′ ∧∧ni=1φ˜i 6⇒ false}
Fig. 1. Semantics of a program expression.
Given an arithmetic expression S˜ = ˜(A˜i)ni=1, from Formula (2.2),
it follows that the error expression ˜(ri, ei)
n
i=1 associated to S˜ is a
correct over-approximation of the round-off error, therefore |S˜ − S| ≤
˜(ri, ei)
n
i=1, where S = RA˜(˜(A˜i)ni=1).
Let ν ∈ Env , I ∈ I, and assume S˜ =if φ˜ then A else B. By structural
induction and by Definition 4, it follows that
errA := max{e | 〈ηA, η˜A〉tA  (rA, v˜A, eA) ∈ E [[A]]Iν ⇓(RB˜(φ˜),φ˜)}
errB := max{e | 〈ηB , η˜B〉tB  (rB , v˜B , eB) ∈ E [[B]]Iν ⇓(RB˜(¬φ˜),¬φ˜)}
In addition, given 〈ηA, η˜A〉tA  (rA, v˜A, eA) ∈ E [[A]]Iν and 〈ηB , η˜B〉tB 
(rB , v˜B , eB) ∈ E [[B]]Iν , the error of taking an unstable path is defined as
the difference between the real and the floating-point results, which is
bounded by the following value erru = max (eA+|rA−rB |, eB+|rB−rA|).
Let e = max{e | 〈η, η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) ∈ E [[if φ˜ then A else B]]Iν}, by
Definition of E [[]] (in Fig. 1), it follows that e = max (errA, errB , erru),
thus |S˜ − S| ≤ e.
The soundness of the error expressions computed by the semantics is
formally proven in PVS.5
4 A Program Transformation to Detect Unstable
Tests
This section presents a program transformation that instruments a floating-
point program to detect unstable tests. The result of this transformation
is a floating-point program that is guaranteed to return either the result
of the original program when it can be assured that both its real and
its floating-point flows agree or a warning when these flows may diverge.
This program transformation extends and improves the one defined in
[53] by providing support for function calls and for-loops, and by adding
mechanisms to detect the test instability with better accuracy. In addi-
tion, the program transformation presented here provides supports for
programs with symbolic parameters. These parameters can be instanti-
ated with concrete value ranges.
The input of the transformation is a real-valued program P . The
straightforward floating-point implementation of P is initially computed
as P˜ := FP˜(P ). Subsequently, P˜ is instrumented to detect unstable tests
and return a corrected value. The Boolean expressions in the guards of
P˜ are replaced with more restrictive ones by taking into consideration
the symbolic round-off error. This is done by means of two Boolean
abstractions β+(), β−() : B˜→ B˜ defined as follows for conjunctions and
disjunction of sign tests.
5 These proofs are part of the PVS development available from https://shemesh.
larc.nasa.gov/fm/PRECiSA.
Definition 5. Let var () : A˜ → V˜ be a function that associate to an
arithmetic expression e˜ ∈ A˜ a variable that represents its accumulated
round-off error, i.e., |e˜ − RA˜(e˜)| ≤ var (e˜). The functions β+(), β−() :
B˜→ B˜ are defined as follows.
β+(e˜ ≤ 0) := e˜ ≤ − var (e˜) β−(e˜ ≤ 0) := e˜ > var (e˜)
β+(e˜ ≥ 0) := e˜ ≥ var (e˜) β−(e˜ ≥ 0) := e˜ < − var (e˜)
β+(e˜ < 0) := e˜ < − var (e˜) β−(e˜ < 0) := e˜ ≥ var (e˜)
β+(e˜ > 0) := e˜ > var (e˜) β
−(e˜ > 0) := e˜ ≤ − var (e˜)
β+(φ1 ∧ φ2) := β+(φ1) ∧ β+(φ2) β−(φ1 ∧ φ2) := β−(φ1) ∨ β−(φ2)
β+(φ1 ∨ φ2) := β+(φ1) ∨ β+(φ2) β−(φ1 ∨ φ2) := β−(φ1) ∧ β−(φ2)
β+(¬φ) := β−(φ) β−(¬φ) := β+(φ)
In addition, let βvar () : B˜ → ℘(V˜) denote the function computing the
error variables introduced by applying β+() and β−() to a Boolean ex-
pression. Given φ, φ1, φ2 ∈ B˜, βvar (e˜  0) := {var (e˜)}, where  ∈ {≥,≤
, >,<} and βvar (φ1φ2) := βvar (φ1) ∪ βvar (φ2), where  ∈ {∧,∨}, and
βvar (¬φ) := βvar (φ).
Generic inequalities of the form a < b are handled by replacing them
with their equivalent sign-test form a − b < 0. The following lemma
states that β+() and β−() correctly approximate a floating-point Boolean
expression and its negation, respectively. It has been proven correct in
PVS.6
Lemma 1. Given e˜ ∈ A˜, let fv(e˜) be the set of free variables in e˜. For
all σ : fv(φ) → R, σ˜ : fv(φ˜) → F, and x˜ ∈ fv(φ˜) such that F(σ(x)) =
σ˜(χf (x)), β
+() and β−() satisfy the following properties.
1. e˜val B˜(σ˜, β
+(φ˜))⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜, φ˜) ∧ evalB(σ, φ).
2. e˜val B˜(σ˜, β
−(φ˜))⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜,¬φ˜) ∧ evalB(σ,¬φ).
Property 1 states that for all floating-point Boolean expressions φ˜, β+(φ˜)
implies both φ˜ and its real-valued counterpart. Symmetrically, Prop-
erty 2 ensures that β−(φ˜) implies both the negation of φ˜ and the negation
of its real-valued counterpart.
The function τ¯() transforms a real-valued program P into a floating-
point program that detects and avoids unstable tests. It is defined as
follows.
Definition 6 (Program Transformation). Let P ∈ P be a real-valued
program, the transformation τ¯() : P→ P˜ is defined as
τ¯(P ) =
⋃
{f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, 1, . . . , k) = S˜ ′ |
f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) = S˜ ∈ FP˜(P ), 〈S˜ ′, {1, . . . , k}〉 = τ(S˜ )}.
6 This proof is available at https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/PRECiSA.
(4.1)
The function τ() : S˜→ S˜×℘(V˜) is defined as follows, where τS() : S˜→ S˜
and τV˜() : S˜→ ℘(V˜) return the first and the second projection of a pair
in S˜× ℘(V˜), respectively.
τ(d˜) = 〈d˜ , ∅〉 τ(x˜) = 〈x˜, ∅〉
τ(˜(A˜i)ni=1) = 〈 if
∨n
i=1(τS(A˜i) = ω) then ω else ˜(τS(A˜i))ni=1, ∅〉
τ(if φ˜ then S˜1 else S˜2) =
〈if φ˜ then τS(S˜1) else τS(S˜2),
τV˜(S˜1) ∪ τV˜(S˜2)〉
if φ˜ = β+(φ˜) and ¬φ˜ = β−(φ˜)
〈 if ∨kj=1(τS(A˜j) = ω) then ω
elsif β+(φ˜) then τS(S˜1)
elsif β−(φ˜) then τS(S˜2)
else ω,
τV˜(S˜1) ∪ τV˜(S˜2) ∪ βvar (φ˜)〉
if φ˜ 6= β+(φ˜) or ¬φ˜ 6= β−(φ˜)
where A˜1, . . . , A˜k are the arithmetic expressions occurring in φ˜.
τ(if φ˜1 then S˜1 [elsif φ˜i then S˜i]
n−1
i=2 else S˜n) =
〈 if φ˜1 then τS(S˜1)
[elsif φ˜i then τS(S˜i)]
n−1
i=2 else τS(S˜n),
n⋃
i=1
τV˜(Si)〉
if∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, φ˜i = β+(φ˜i)
and¬φ˜i = β−(φ˜i)
〈 if ∨kj=1(τS(A˜j) = ω) then ω
elsif β+(φ˜1) then τS(S˜1)
[elsif β+(φ˜i) ∧
∧i−1
j=1 β
−(φ˜j) then τS(S˜i)]n−1i=2
elsif
∧n−1
j=1 β
−(φ˜j) then τS(S˜n)
else ω,
n⋃
i=1
(τV˜(S˜i) ∪ βvar (φ˜i))〉
otherwise
where A˜1, . . . , A˜k are the arithmetic expressions occurring in φ˜1, . . . , φ˜n.
τ(let x˜ = A˜ in S˜ ) = 〈if τS(A˜) = ω then ω else let x˜ = τS(A˜) in τS(S˜ ), τV˜(S˜ )〉
τ(for(i0, in, acc0, λ(i, acc).S˜ )) = 〈for(i0, in, acc0, λ(i, acc). τS(S˜ )), τV˜(S˜ )〉
τ(g˜(A˜1, . . . , A˜n)) = 〈 if
n∨
j=1
(τS(A˜i) = ω) then ω else g˜
τ (τS(A˜1), . . . , τS(A˜n),
′1, . . . , 
′
m),
n⋃
i=1
{′i}〉,
where g˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, 1, . . . , m) ∈ τ¯(P )
and for all i = 1 . . .m, if i = var (e˜i), then
′i = var (e˜i[x˜j ← τS(A˜j)]nj=1).
The transformation defined here applies the Boolean approximation func-
tions β+() and β−() to the guards in the conditionals and adds new
arguments to the function declarations. These new arguments represent
the round-off error of the arithmetic expressions occurring in the body
of each test. For each function declaration, the set of new error variables
used in its transformation is built. This set contains the error variables
introduced by the application of β+() and β−(), and the error variables
used in the function calls in the body of the declaration. The transfor-
mation τ(), defined in Definition 6, proceeds by structural induction as
explained below.
Constants and Variables. Variables and constants are untouched by
the transformation.
Arithmetic operator. When an arithmetic operator is applied, it is
necessary to check if the returning value of any of the operands is
a warning ω. If this is the case, the warning is propagated to the
operation. Otherwise, the result of the operation is returned.
Binary conditional. When the round-off error does not affect the eval-
uation of the Boolean expression, i.e., φ˜ = β+(φ˜) and φ˜ = β−(φ˜),
the transformation function τ() is recursively applied to the subpro-
grams S˜1 and S˜2. Otherwise, the test on φ˜ is replaced by two more
restrictive tests on β+(φ˜) and β−(φ˜). The then branch is taken when
β+(φ˜) is satisfied. By Property 1, this means that in the original pro-
gram both φ˜ and R(φ˜) hold and, thus, the then branch is taken in
both real and floating-point control flows. The else branch of the
transformed program is taken when β−(φ˜) holds. This means, by
Property 2, that in the original program the else branch is taken in
both real and floating-point control flows. When neither β+(φ˜) nor
β−(φ˜) is satisfied or when one of the arithmetic expressions occurring
in φ˜ is evaluated to ω, a warning ω is issued indicating that floating-
point and real flows may diverge. The function βvar () is applied to
φ˜ to collect the new error variables introduced by the application of
β+() and β−().
N-ary conditional. In the case the round-off error does not affect the
evaluation of any of the Boolean expression in the n-ary conditional,
the Boolean guards are untouched and the transformation function
τ() is applied recursively to the subprograms S˜1, . . . , S˜2.
Otherwise, the guard φ˜i of the i-th branch is replaced by the con-
junction of β+(φ˜i) and β
−(φ˜j) for all the previous branches j < i.
By properties 1 and 2, it follows that the transformed program takes
the i-th branch only when the same branch is taken in both real
and floating-point control flows of the original program. Addition-
ally, a warning is issued by the transformed program when real and
floating-point control flows of the original program differ or when
one of the arithmetic expressions occurring in the guards φ˜1, . . . , φ˜n
is evaluated to ω. The new variables introduced by the application
of β+() and β−() in each branch are collected by means of the βvar ()
function.
Let-in expression. For a let-in expression, it is necessary to check that
the value that is assigned to the local variable is different from the
warning.
For loop. The transformation is applied to the body of the for-loop.
Function call. When a function g˜ is called, it is necessary to check if
the returning value is a warning ω. In addition, new error variables
′1, . . . , 
′
m are introduced to model the instantiated error parameters
where the formal parameters x˜1, . . . , x˜n are replaced by the actual
parameters A˜1, . . . , A˜n. These new variables are added to the set of
error variables τV˜(S˜ ).
Example 2. Consider again a fragment of the DAIDALUS library. The
real-valued program VWCV ∈ P consists of the functions tcoa, vwcv ,
and vmd . The function vwcv determines if two aircrafts, whose relative
vertical position and velocity are given by s and v, respectively, are in
loss of vertical well clear. The function tcoa (time to co-altitude) was
already introduced in Example 1. The function vmd is called vertical
miss distance. When the aircraft are vertically converging this function
simplifies to 0. Otherwise, the function simplifies to the current relative
altitude. These simplifications are not taken into account by the trans-
formation technique. The constants ZTHR and TCOA are time and dis-
tance thresholds, respectively, used in the definition of the DAIDALUS
well-clear concept.
tcoa(s, v) =if s ∗ v < 0 then −(s/v) else 0
vwcv(s, v) = if abs(s) ≤ ZTHR then 1
elsif tcoa(s, v) ≥ 0 ∧ tcoa(s, v) ≤ TCOA then 1
else 0
vmd(s, v) = abs(s+ tcoa(s, v) ∗ v)
The following program τ¯(VWCV ) is obtained by using the transforma-
tion in Definition 6.
t˜coa
τ
(s˜, v˜, e) = if s˜∗˜v˜ < −e then −(s˜/˜v˜)
elsif s˜∗˜v˜ ≥ e then 0
else ω
v˜wcv
τ
(s˜, v˜, e1, e2, e3) =
if t˜coa
τ
(s˜, v˜) = ω then ω
elsif abs(s˜)− ZTHR ≤ e1
then 1
elsif abs(s˜)− ZTHR > e1 ∧ (t˜coaτ (s˜, v˜) ≥ e2 ∨ t˜coaτ (s˜, v˜)− TCOA ≤ e3)
then 1
elsif abs(s˜)− ZTHR > e1 ∧ t˜coaτ (s˜, v˜) < −e2 ∧ t˜coaτ (s˜, v˜)− TCOA < −e3
then 0
else ω
v˜md
τ
(s˜, v˜, e) = if t˜coa
τ
(s˜, v˜) = ω then ω else abs(s˜+˜t˜coa
τ
(s˜, v˜, e)∗˜v˜)
All test inequalities occurring in VWCV have been rearranged to be in
the form of a sign test. The floating-point parameters are the rounding
of the real ones, i.e., s = χr (s˜) and v = χr (v˜). The error variable e is
introduced as a parameter in t˜coa
τ
to model an over-approximation of
the round-off error of s˜∗˜v˜. The same error variable has to be added as a
parameter to the function v˜md
τ
that calls t˜coa
τ
. The function v˜wcv
τ
has
three additional parameters e1, e2, and e3 modeling the round-off errors
of abs(s˜) − ZTHR, t˜coaτ (s˜, v˜), and t˜coaτ (s˜, v˜) − TCOA, respectively.
A check on the return value of the function t˜coa
τ
(s˜, v˜) is performed to
ensure it is not a warning in both v˜wcv
τ
and v˜md
τ
.
The following lemma states the correctness of the program transfor-
mation τ¯(). If the transformed program τ¯(P ) returns an output v˜ dif-
ferent from ω, then the floating-point version of original program FP˜(P )
follows a stable path and returns the floating-point output v˜. Further-
more, in the case the original program presents an unstable behavior,
the transformed program returns ω.
Lemma 2. Let P ∈ P be a real-valued program, P˜ := FP˜(P ) be its
floating-point version, and P˜
τ
:= τ¯(P ) be the transformed floating-point
program. For each f˜(x˜1,. . . ,x˜n) = S ∈ P˜ , σ : {χr (x˜1) . . . χr (x˜n)} → R,
and σ˜ : {x˜1 . . . x˜n} → F, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R(σ˜(x˜i)) =
σ(x˜i):
1. for all 〈η′, η˜′〉t′  (r′, v˜′, e′) ∈ F [[P˜
τ
]](f˜) such that v˜′ 6= ω, there ex-
ists 〈η, η˜〉s  (r, v˜, e) ∈ F [[P˜ ]](f˜) such that e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜′)⇒ evalB(σ, η)∧
e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜) and v˜ = v˜
′;
2. for all 〈η, η˜〉u  (r, v˜, e)∈ F [[P˜ ]](f˜), there exists 〈η′,η˜′〉t′  (ω,ω, e′)∈
F [[P˜ τ ]](f˜) such that evalB(σ, η) ∧ e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜)⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜′).
Proof (Proof Sketch). In the following, by abuse of notation, τ() will be
used with the meaning of its first projection τS(). Let P ∈ P, P˜ = FP˜(P ),
and P˜
τ
= τ¯(P ). For each declaration f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) = S˜ occurring in P˜ ,
there exists a declaration f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em) = τ(S˜ ) in P˜
τ
. Thus
a conditional tuple c ∈ F [[P˜ ]](f˜) if and only if c ∈ E [[S˜ ]]F [[P˜ ]]ν . Additionally,
let σ : {χr (x˜1) . . . χr (x˜n)} → R and σ˜ : {x˜1 . . . x˜n} → F be two variable
environments such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R(σ˜(x˜i)) = σ(x˜i). The
proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the program expression
S˜ . The thesis follows from the definition of τ(), the definition of ⇓(,),
and by the properties 1 and 2. The key case of the conditional expression
is shown below.
Let S˜ :=if φ˜ then A else B and let φ˜ω :=
∨k
j=1(A˜j = ω) for
A˜1, . . . , A˜k occurring in φ˜. The transformed version of S˜ obtained by
Definition 6 is
τ(S˜ ) = if φ˜ω then ω
elsif β+(φ˜) then τS(A) elsif β
−(φ˜) then τS(B) else ω.
The two conclusions of Theorem 2 are proved separately.
1. Let c ∈ E [[τ(S˜ )]]F [[P˜ ]]ν . It is possible to distinguish six cases for which
the floating-point result is different from the warning value ω. Each
case corresponds to a combination of real and floating-point flows
for the transformed program expression S˜ . The proof of one repre-
sentative case is shown below. The other proofs are analogous and
they use Property 1 (respectively Property 2) when the considered
conditional tuple models the then (respectively else) branch of the
floating-point computational flow.
Let c := 〈RB˜(β+(φ˜)) ∧ RB˜(¬φ˜ω) ∧ η, β+(φ˜) ∧ ¬φ˜ω ∧ η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) ∈
E [[τ(S˜ )]]F [[P˜
τ
]]
ν . By Definition 4, it follows that 〈η, η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) ∈
E [[τ(A)]]F [[P˜
τ
]]
ν . By inductive hypothesis, it follows that there ex-
ists 〈η′, η˜′〉t′  (r′, v˜′, e′) ∈ E [[A]]F [[P˜ ]]ν such that e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜′) ⇒
evalB(σ, η) ∧ e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜) and v˜ = v˜′. By definition of E [[]], it fol-
lows that there exits c′ := 〈RB˜(φ˜) ∧ η′, φ˜ ∧ η˜′〉t′  (r′, v˜′, e′) ∈
E [[S˜ ]]F [[P˜ ]]ν . Finally, by Property 1 it holds that e˜val B˜(σ˜, β+(φ˜)) ⇒
evalB(σ,RB˜(φ˜)) ∧ e˜val B˜(σ˜, φ˜). Thus, e˜val B˜(σ˜, β+(φ˜) ∧ ¬φω ∧ η˜′) ⇒
evalB(σ,RB˜(φ˜) ∧ η) ∧ e˜val B˜(σ˜, φ˜ ∧ η˜), which concludes the proof for
this case.
2. Let c ∈ E [[S˜ ]]F [[P˜ ]]ν . It is possible to distinguish six cases for which the
stability flag of c is set to unstable (u). Two of these cases correspond
to a direct instability of the conditional S˜ =if φ˜ then A else B,
while the other four are a consequence of the instability of the sub-
expressions A or B. The proofs of one representative for each of these
cases are shown below. The proofs for the other cases are analogous.
(a) Let c := 〈RB˜(φ˜) ∧ ηA,¬φ˜ ∧ η˜B〉t  (rA, v˜B , eB + |rA − v˜B |) ∈
E [[S ]]F [[P˜ ]]ν such that 〈ηA, η˜A〉tA  (rA, v˜A, eA) ∈ E [[A]]F [[P˜ ]]ν and
〈ηB , η˜B〉tB  (rB , v˜B , eB) ∈ E [[B]]F [[P˜ ]]ν .
By Definition 6, 〈RB˜(¬β+(φ˜))∧RB˜(¬β−(φ˜))∧¬RB˜(φ˜ω),¬β+(φ˜)∧
¬β−(φ˜)∧¬φ˜ω〉t  (ω, ω, e) ∈ E [[τ(S )]]F [[P˜
τ
]]
ν and 〈RB˜(φ˜ω), φ˜ω〉t 
(ω, ω, e) ∈ E [[τ(S )]]F [[P˜
τ
]]
ν . It is possible to distinguish two cases.
If φ˜ω holds, the thesis follows directly. Otherwise, if ¬φ˜ω holds,
from Property 1, it follows that evalB(σ,RB˜(φ˜)∧ηA)⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜,¬β−(φ˜))
and by Property 2, it follows that evalB(σ,¬φ˜∧η˜B)⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜,¬β+(φ˜)).
Thus, evalB(σ,RB˜(φ˜)∧ηA)∧e˜val B˜(σ˜,¬φ˜∧η˜B)⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜,¬β−(φ˜)∧
¬β+(φ˜) ∧ ¬φ˜ω), from which the thesis follows.
(b) Let c := 〈RB˜(φ˜) ∧ ηA, φ˜ ∧ η˜A〉t  (rA, v˜A, eA) ∈ E [[S ]]F [[P˜ ]]ν such
that 〈ηA, η˜A〉u  (rA, v˜A, eA) ∈ E [[A]]F [[P˜ ]]ν . By inductive hypoth-
esis, there exists 〈η′A, η˜′A〉t  (ω, ω, e) ∈ E [[τ(A)]]F [[P˜
τ
]]
ν such that
evalB(σ, ηA) ∧ e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜A) ⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜′A). By Definition 4 and
the Definition of E [[]], there exists c′ ∈ E [[τ(S )]]F [[P˜
τ
]]
ν of the follow-
ing form c′ := 〈RB˜(φ˜)∧η′A, φ˜∧η˜′A〉t  (ω, ω, e). It directly follows
that evalB(σ,RB˜(φ˜)∧ηA)∧ e˜val B˜(σ˜, φ˜∧ η˜A)⇒ e˜val B˜(σ˜, η˜′A), from
which the thesis follows.
The program transformation defined in Definition 6 has been formalized
and Theorem 2 has been proven in PVS.7 It follows that the straight-
forward floating-point implementation of the original program and the
transformed program return the same output when the transformed pro-
gram does not emit a warning.
Theorem 2. Given P ∈ P, for all function f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) = S˜ ∈ FP˜(P ),
let f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em) ∈ τ¯(P ) be its transformed version. It holds
that
f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em) 6= ω
⇐⇒
f˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) = f˜
τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em)
where f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em) ∈ τ¯(P ).
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 2.
7 This formalization is available at https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/PRECiSA.
The intended semantics of the floating-point transformed program τ¯(P )
is the real-valued semantics of the original program P , i.e., the real-
valued semantics of the transformed program RP˜(τ¯(P )) is not relevant for
the notion of correctness considered in this work. Therefore, even if the
transformed program presents unstable tests with respect to RP˜(τ¯(P )),
Theorem 3 ensures that its floating-point control flow preserves the con-
trol flow of stable tests in the original specification P on real arith-
metic. The difference between the real number specification P and the
transformed floating-point implementation τ¯(P ) is bounded by the error
occurring in the straightforward implementation of P , FP˜(P ), assum-
ing that real and floating-point flows always coincide. This assumption
is known as stable test assumption. In this modality, the error corre-
sponding to the unstable cases is not considered, and the overall error
corresponds to the error associated uniquely to the stable cases.
Theorem 3 (Program Transformation Correctness). Given P ∈
P, for all f(x1, . . . , xn) = S ∈ P , let f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em) ∈ τ¯(P )
be its transformed floating-point version. Let σ : {x1 . . . xn} → R, and
σ˜ : {x˜1 . . . x˜n} → F, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R(σ˜(x˜i)) = σ(xi),
it holds that
f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em) 6= ω
⇐⇒
|f(x1, . . . , xn)− f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em)| ≤ ef˜
where f˜τ (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, e1, . . . , em) ∈ τ¯(P ) and ef˜ = max{e | ∀1 ≤ i ≤
n, 〈η, η˜〉t  (r, v˜, e) ∈ F [[FP˜(P )]](f˜), t = s}.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
5 Automatic Generation and Verification of
Test-Stable C Code
This section presents a formal approach to automatically generate and
formally verify a test-stable C implementation of an algorithm from its
real-valued PVS specification. This approach relies on several tools: the
interactive prover PVS, the static analyzer PRECiSA, the global opti-
mizer Kodiak [46]8, and the static analyzer of C code Frama-C. The
input is a real-valued program expressed in the PVS specification lan-
guage and the desired floating-point precision (single and double preci-
sion are supported). In addition, initial ranges for the input variables
can be provided. The output is an annotated C program that is guaran-
teed to emit a warning when real and floating-point paths diverge in the
original program. An overview of the approach is depicted in Fig. 2.
8 Kodiak is available from https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/Kodiak/.
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Fig. 2. Toolchain for automatically generate and verify test-stable C code.
PRECiSA9 (Program Round-off Error Certifier via Static Analy-
sis) [41,51] is a static analyzer for floating-point programs. PRECiSA
accepts as input a floating-point program and computes a sound over-
approximation of the accumulated round-off error that may occur for
each combination of real and floating-point computational flows. PRE-
CiSA implements a variant of the semantics defined in Section 3 and uses
abstract interpretation [16] techniques to avoid the state explosion prob-
lem derived from the combination of al real and floating-point flows [51].
PRECiSA is able to reason on the differences between real and floating-
point computational flows. Thus, it can compute the round-off errors
associated with both stable and unstable cases separately. If needed,
PRECiSA supports the stable test assumption, which assumes that real
and floating-point flows always coincide.
In this work, PRECiSA is extended to implement the transformation
defined in Section 4 and to generate the corresponding C code. Given
a real-valued program P and a desired floating-point format (single or
double precision), PRECiSA converts P into its straightforward floating-
point implementation P˜ := FP˜(P ). Integer operations, variables, and
constants are left unchanged since they do not carry round-off errors.
Subsequently, the transformation presented in Section 4 is applied to P˜ .
The transformed program is then converted into C syntax with ACSL
Specification Language annotations. ACSL [2] is a behavioral specifica-
tion language for C programs centered on the notion of function contract.
It is used to state pre- and post-conditions, assertions, and invariants.
For each function f˜τ in the transformed program, a C procedure
is automatically generated. In addition, each function f in the original
specification is expressed as a logic axiomatic function in ACSL syntax.
ACSL preconditions are added to relate each C floating-point expres-
sion with its logic real-valued counterpart through the error variable
9 The PRECiSA distribution is available at https://github.com/nasa/PRECiSA.
representing its round-off error. As mentioned in Section 4, a new error
variable e := var (e˜) is introduced for each floating-point arithmetic ex-
pression e˜ occurring in the conditional tests. For each new error variable,
a precondition stating that |e˜−RA˜(e˜)| ≤ e is added. A post-condition is
added for each function stating that, when the transformed function f˜τ
does not emit a warning, the difference between f˜τ and its real-number
specification f is at most the round-off error that would occur in the
straightforward floating-point implementation of f assuming the stable
test assumption (see Theorem 3). The above mentioned round-off er-
rors are symbolically estimated by PRECiSA. Besides the transformed
C program, PVS certificates are generated to ensure the soundness of
the computed estimations with respect to the floating-point IEEE-754
standard [35]. These certificates can be automatically discharged in PVS
thanks to proof strategies that recursively inspect the round-off error ex-
pression and applies the correspondent lemmas formalized in the PVS
floating-point round-off error formalization [10].
The tool suite Frama-C [37] is used to compute a set of verifica-
tion conditions (VCs) stating the relationship between the transformed
floating-point program and the original real-valued specification. Frama-
C includes several static analyzers for the C language that support ACSL
annotations [2]. The Frama-C WP plug-in implements the weakest pre-
condition calculus for ACSL annotations through C programs. For each
annotation, Frama-C computes a set of verification conditions in the
form of mathematical first-order logic formulas. These verification con-
ditions can be proved by a combination of external automated theorem
provers, proof assistants, and SMT solvers.
In this paper, the WP plug-in has been extended to emit VCs in the
PVS specification language. This extension relates the proof obligations
generated by Frama-C with the certificates emitted by PRECiSA. These
certificates ensure that the error bounds used to compute the program
transformation are correct.
Example 3. Consider the functions t˜coa
τ
and v˜md
τ
, defined in Exam-
ple 2, and their real specifications tcoa and vmd , respectively. The ver-
ification condition computed by Frama-C for the function t˜coa is the
following.
ϕt˜coaτ :=∀e, s, v, es, ev ∈ R, s˜, v˜, r˜es ∈ F
(r˜es 6= ω ∧ e ≥ 0 ∧ |v˜ − v| ≤ ev ∧ |s˜− s| ≤ es
∧ |(s˜∗˜v˜)− (v ∗ s)| ≤ e ∧ ϕ′
⇒ |r˜es− tcoa(s, v)| ≤ 
/˜
(s, es, v, ev))
The formula ϕ′ models the syntactic structure of t˜coa
τ
and is defined as
follows:
ϕ′ :=(s˜∗˜v˜ < −e⇒ r˜es = −(s˜/˜v˜)) ∧ (s˜∗˜v˜ ≥ −e⇒ (r˜es = 0 ∧ s˜∗˜v˜ ≥ e)).
The variable e denotes the round-off error of the expression s˜∗˜v˜, which
is introduced when the Boolean approximations β+() and β−() are ap-
plied. The variable r˜es denotes the result of the transformed function
t˜coa
τ
. The validity of this verification condition follows from: (1) the
equality between r˜es and the result of t˜coa when the transformed func-
tion does not emit a warning, and (2) the PRECiSA certificate stating
the correctness of the symbolic round-off error bound 
/˜
(s, es, v, ev).
The verification conditions computed by Frama-C for the function
v˜md is the following.
ϕ
v˜md
τ :=∀e, s, v, es, ev ∈ R, s˜, v˜, r˜es ∈ F
r˜es
v˜md
τ 6= ω ∧ r˜est˜coaτ 6= ω
e ≥ 0 ∧ |v˜ − v| ≤ ev|s˜− s| ≤ es ∧ |(s˜∗˜v˜)− (v ∗ s)| ≤ e
r˜es
v˜md
τ = s˜+˜(r˜est˜coaτ ∗˜v˜)∧
ϕt˜coaτ [r˜es← r˜est˜coaτ ] ∧ ϕ′[r˜es← r˜est˜coaτ ]
⇒ |r˜es
v˜md
τ − vmd(s, v)| ≤ e
v˜md
,
where e
v˜md
is the symbolic error computed by PRECiSA for v˜md , i.e.,
|v˜md(s˜, v˜)− vmd(s, v)| ≤ e
v˜md
, and the variable r˜es
v˜md
τ denotes the re-
sult of the transformed function v˜md
τ
. In addition, ϕt˜coaτ [r˜es← r˜est˜coaτ ]
expresses the verification condition of the function t˜coa where r˜est˜coaτ
denotes the result of the function t˜coa
τ
. The proof proceeds similarly to
the one for t˜coa.
PRECiSA handles programs with symbolic parameters and generates
a symbolic expression modeling an over-estimation of the round-off error
that may occur. Given input ranges for the variables, a numerical eval-
uation of the symbolic expressions is performed in PRECiSA with the
help of Kodiak, a rigorous global optimizer for real-valued expressions.
Kodiak performs a branch-and-bound search that computes a sound en-
closure for a symbolic error expression using either interval arithmetic
or Bernstein polynomial basis. The algorithm recursively splits the do-
main of the function into smaller subdomains and computes an enclo-
sure of the original expression in these subdomains. The recursion stops
when a precise enclosure is found, based on a given precision, or when a
given maximum recursion depth is reached. The output of the algorithm
is a numerical enclosure for the symbolic error expression. As already
mentioned, PRECiSA emits certificates ensuring the correctness of both
symbolic and numerical error bounds. Therefore, when the input ranges
for the parameters are known, it is possible to instantiate the error vari-
ables in the transformed program with numerical values representing a
provably correct round-off error over-estimation.
Example 4. Consider the symbolic verification conditions shown in Ex-
ample 3 for t˜coa and v˜md . Assume s˜ ranges between 0 and 1000, and v˜
between 1 and 200.
ϕt˜coaτ :=∀s˜, v˜, r˜est˜coa ∈ F, 0 ≤ s˜ ≤ 1000 ∧ 1 ≤ v˜ ≤ 200 ∧ |s− s˜| ≤ 12 ulp(s)∧
|v − v˜| ≤ 12 ulp(v) ∧ ϕ′[r˜es← r˜est˜coaτ , e← 4.01E-11]
⇒ |r˜est˜coaτ − tcoa(s, v)| ≤ 7.35E-13
ϕ
v˜md
τ :=∀s˜, v˜, r˜est˜coa ∈ F, 0 ≤ s˜ ≤ 1000 ∧ 1 ≤ v˜ ≤ 200 ∧ |s− s˜| ≤ 12 ulp(s)
∧ |v − v˜| ≤ 12 ulp(v)∧
r˜es
v˜md
τ = s˜+˜(r˜est˜coaτ ∗˜v˜) ∧ ϕ′[r˜es← r˜est˜coaτ , e← 4.01E-11]
⇒ |r˜es
v˜md
τ − vmd(s, v)| ≤ 4.43E-12
The arguments of t˜coa and v˜md are assumed to be the nearest floats to
the arguments of the real-valued algorithms tcoa and vmd , respectively.
Similarly to Example 3, the proof of these verification conditions follows
from the fact that r˜est˜coaτ is equal to t˜coa(s˜, v˜), r˜esv˜mdτ is equal to
v˜md(s˜, v˜), and from the numerical certificate output by PRECiSA.
Proof strategies are implemented to automatically discharge the VCs
generated by Frama-C in PVS. Thus, no expertise on floating-point arith-
metic is required to verify the correctness of the generated C code.
6 Related Work
The related work is divided into two main categories: (i) analysis and
verification of numerical properties of C code and (ii) program optimiza-
tions and precision allocation tools that aim at improving both efficiency
and precision of finite-precision programs.
6.1 Analysis of numerical properties of C programs
Several tools are available for analyzing numerical aspects of C pro-
grams. In this work, the Frama-C [37] platform is used. As already men-
tioned, Frama-C is a collaborative and extensible platform dedicated to
the analysis and verification of C code. It provides a series of ready-to-use
plug-ins that perform different tasks and collaborate with each other. In
particular, this work uses the WP plug-in that is based on the weakest
precondition calculus. ACSL annotations are translated in proof obliga-
tions that are submitted to a set of external provers. Frama-C provides
support for several external provers such as Coq [3] and Alt-Ergo [15],
as well as SMT solvers such as Yices [29], Z3 [27], CVC3 [1] (through
the Why [5] platform).
Support for floating-point round-off error analysis in Frama-C is pro-
vided by the integration with the tool Gappa [25]. However, the appli-
cability of Gappa is limited to straight-line programs without condition-
als. Gappa’s ability to verify more complex programs requires adding
additional ACSL intermediate assertions and providing hints through
annotation that may be unfeasible to automatically generate. The inter-
active theorem prover Coq can also be used to prove verification con-
ditions on floating-point numbers thanks to the formalization defined
in [9]. Nevertheless, Coq tactics need to be implemented to automatize
the verification process. Several approaches have been proposed for the
verification of numerical C code by using Frama-C in combination with
Gappa and/or Coq [7,8,52]. These methods were successfully applied to
the formal verification of different software: wave propagation differential
equations [6], a pairwise state-based conflict detection algorithm [31], an
aircraft position encoding algorithm [52], and industrial software related
to inertial navigation [38]. In [40], an instance of the technique presented
in this paper is used to verify a specific case study of a point-in-polygon
containment algorithm. In contrast to the present work, the verification
conditions generated by Frama-C are manually proven in PVS. The tech-
niques presented in the current work has been fully automated and do
not require user intervention in either the specification or the verifica-
tion of the C code. Indeed, from the generation of a test-stable program
to its verification, no hint, additional specification, or proving effort is
required from the user.
Besides Frama-C, other tools are available to formally verify and
analyze numerical properties of C code. Fluctuat [32] is a commercial
static analyzer that, given a C program with annotations about input
bounds and uncertainties on its arguments, produces an estimation of
the round-off error of the program decomposed with respect to its prove-
nance. Fluctuat computes the round-off error approximation by using a
zonotopic abstract domain [33] based on affine arithmetic [26]. Fluc-
tuat is able to warn about the presence of possible unstable tests in the
analyzed program, as explained in [34], and it provides support for iter-
ative programs by using a widening operator [30,?]. The static analyzer
Astre´e [17] detects the presence of run-time exceptions such as division by
zero and under and over-flows by means of sound floating-point abstract
domains [39,13]. Astre´e has been successfully applied to automatically
check the absence of runtime errors associated with floating-point com-
putations in aerospace control software [4]. More specifically, in [28], the
fly-by-wire primary software of commercial airplanes is verified. Astre´e
and Fluctuat were combined to analyze on-board software acting in the
Monitoring and Safing Unit of the ATV space vehicle [11]. Neither Fluc-
tuat nor Astre´e emit proof certificates that can be externally checked by
an external prover to validate its result.
6.2 Precision allocation and program optimization
Recently, several program manipulation tools have been proposed with
the aim of improving the accuracy and efficiency of floating-point com-
putations. Among these tools, it is possible to identify two kinds of ap-
proaches: program optimization tools and precision allocation ones.
Program optimization tools aim at improving the accuracy of floating-
point programs by rewriting arithmetic expressions in equivalent ones
with a lower accumulated round-off error. Herbie [44] automatically im-
proves the precision of floating-point programs through a heuristic search.
Herbie detects the expressions where rounding-errors occur and it applies
a series of rewriting and simplification rules. It generates a set of trans-
formed programs that are equivalent to the original one but potentially
more accurate. The rewriting and simplification process is then applied
recursively to the generated transformed programs until the most accu-
rate program is obtained. Similarly, AutoRNP [54] is a tool that detects
and repairs high floating-point errors in numerical libraries. CoHD [49]
is a source-to-source transformer for C code that automatically com-
pensates for the round-off errors of some basic floating-point operations.
SyHD [50] is a C code optimizer that explores a set of programs generated
by CoDH and selects the one with the best accuracy and computation-
time trade-off. Sardana [36], given a Lustre [12] program, produces a
set of equivalent programs with simplified arithmetic expressions. Then,
it selects the ones for which a better accuracy bound can be proved.
Salsa [18] combines Sardana with techniques for intra-procedure [19] and
inter-procedure [20,21] program transformation in order to improve the
accuracy of a target variable in larger pieces of code containing assign-
ments and control structures.
Precision allocation (or tuning) tools aim at selecting the lowest
floating-point precision for the program variables that is enough to achieve
the desired accuracy. The aim of tuning tools it to avoid using more preci-
sion than needed in finite-precision computations in order to improve the
performance of the program. Rosa [22,23] compiles an ideal real-valued
program in a finite-precision version (if it exists) that is guaranteed to
meet a desired overall precision. It proceeds by associating a certain pre-
cision (single or double floats, or 32 or 64 bits fixed-point numbers) to all
the variable of the program, and by checking if the accumulated round-
off error is lower than the desired precision. This checking is based on a
combination of affine arithmetic with SMT-solving. Rosa soundly deals
with unstable tests and with bounded loops when the variable appearing
in the loop are restricted to a finite domain. FPTuner [14] implements a
rigorous approach to precision allocation of mixed-precision arithmetic
expressions. FPTuner relies on the tool FPTaylor that correctly esti-
mates round-off errors via Symbolic Taylor Expansions [47] and emits
the corresponding proof certificates in HOL-light. Precimonius [45] is
a dynamic tool able to identify parts of a program that can be per-
formed at a lower precision. It generates a transformed program where
each floating-point variable is typed to the lowest precision necessary
to meet a set of given accuracy and performance constraints. Hence,
the transformed program uses variables of lower precision and performs
better than the original program. In [53], a first version of the verified
source-to-source transformation presented in Section 4 is defined for a
fragment of the expression language of Equation (3.1). To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, the program transformation proposed in the present
work is the only approach that addresses the problem of correcting test
instability for floating-point programs with non-recursive function calls,
bounded loops, and symbolic parameters.
7 Conclusion
Unstable tests, which occur when rounding errors affect the evaluation of
the guards in conditional tests, are hard to detect and correct without the
expert use of specialized tools. This paper presents a toolchain to auto-
matically generate and verify floating-point C code that soundly detects
the presence of unstable tests with respect to an ideal real number spec-
ification. This toolchain allows a user to write a target program assum-
ing real arithmetic without having to deal with floating-point round-off
errors. The proposed toolchain relies on different formal tools and tech-
niques that have been extended and improved to make the generation
and verification processes fully automatic.
As part of the proposed toolchain, a program transformation, orig-
inally proposed in [53], has been enhanced with support for symbolic
parameters, function calls, and bounded loops. This transformation in-
struments a generated program to emit a warning when real and floating-
point flow may diverge. Furthermore, the static analyzer PRECiSA [41,51]
has been extended with two modules. One module implements the trans-
formation defined in Section 4. The other module generates the corre-
sponding C/ACSL code. Thus, given a PVS program specification writ-
ten in real arithmetic and the desired precision, PRECiSA automatically
generates a test-stable floating-point version in C syntax enriched with
ACSL annotations. A probably correct over-estimation of the over-all
round-off error is also computed to bound the difference between the
evaluation of the real number specification and its implementation using
floats. Additionally, PVS proof certificates are automatically generated
by PRECiSA to ensure the correctness of the round-off error overesti-
mations used in the program transformation.
The absence of unstable tests in the resulting floating-point imple-
mentation and the soundness of the computed round-off errors are auto-
matically verified using a combination of Frama-C, PRECiSA, and PVS.
The Frama-C/WP [37] plug-in has been extended to generate verification
conditions in PVS syntax. This extension enables a smooth integration
between the proof obligations generated by Frama-C and the proof cer-
tificates generated by PRECiSA. Having externally checkable certificates
increases the level of confidence in the proposed approach. In addition,
no theorem proving expertise is required from the user since proof strate-
gies, which have been implemented as part of this work, automatically
discharge the verification conditions generated by Frama-C.
To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first automatic tech-
nique that is able to generate a formally-verified floating-point program
instrumented to detect unstable tests. The approach has been applied to
a fragment of NASA’s DAIDALUS software library [42], which serves as
a reference implementation of minimum operational performance stan-
dards of detect-and-avoid for unmanned aircraft systems in FAA’s DO-
365. Nevertheless, an extensive experimental evaluation is needed in or-
der to assess the scalability of the proposed approach and its applicability
to real-world applications.
In the proposed approach, the generation of C code and its veri-
fication are fully-automatic. However, for-loops invariants have to be
provided as part of the input real-number specification. The automation
of this step by using loop invariant generation techniques is planned as
future work. Another interesting future direction is the integration of the
proposed approach with numerical optimization tools such as Salsa [18]
and Herbie [44]. This integration will improve the accuracy of the math-
ematical expressions used inside a program and, at the same time, pre-
vent unstable tests that may cause unexpected behaviors. Alternatively,
the proposed approach could also be combined with tuning precision
techniques [22,14]. Since the program transformation lowers the over-all
round-off error, this would likely to increase the chance of finding a pre-
cision allocation meeting the target accuracy. Finally, the authors plan
to enhance the approach to support floating-point special values and
exceptions such as under- and over-flows and division by zero.
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